










Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Hahonou, E. K. (2009). Slavery and Politics: Stigma, Decentralisation, and Political Representation in Niger and
Benin. In B. Rossi (Ed.), Reconfiguring slavery: West African Trajectories (pp. 152-181). Liverpool University
Press.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact rucforsk@ruc.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 27. Mar. 2021
• 152 •
In pre-colonial African societies, access to village spaces and ‘spaces of sover-
eignty’ was determined by sex (men rather than women), age (older rather 
than younger) and social status (free men rather than slaves), and not by egali-
tarian principles (Olivier de Sardan, 1994). Colonialism profoundly altered 
pre-existing forms of governance. However, it did not call into question 
considerations relative to ‘political adulthood’ (Olivier de Sardan, 1994, 120), 
which continued to set the rules of competition in local political arenas 
even after independence and successive waves of democratisation. In spite 
of numerous regime changes, women, young men and descendants of slaves 
remained politically marginal.
From the beginning of the 1990s, donor-led decentralisation appeared to 
both scholars and activists as the best way to promote democratisation ‘from 
the bottom’ (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990). Democratisation was presented as a 
cure to all the ills suffered by centralised African states. It was supposed to 
increase respect for human rights, to promote ‘good governance’, transparency 
and accountability (and thus stimulate the efficient management of public 
resources), to stimulate popular participation in development and to empower 
the most destitute and marginalised groups. Decentralisation, initiated from 
the exterior and taken up by internal forces (e.g. the case of Tuareg revolts in 
Niger and Mali), was eventually implemented by African governments. In the 
case of Benin and Niger, the reforms announced at national conferences from 
the beginning of the 1990s were not implemented until 2002–2003 and 2004, 
respectively. In both countries, groups of former slaves, until then politically 
marginalised and stigmatised, took advantage of the opportunities created by 
decentralisation to access political power at the local level.
Based on fieldwork conducted in Benin and Niger between 2002 and 
2007, this essay1 compares the processes of political emancipation followed by 
different groups of slave descent. In all of the three groups discussed in this 
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chapter, slave descendants outnumber the descendants of old elites. While in 
the Songhay context the aristocracy has maintained its privileges and political 
power locally, former Tuareg2 and Peul slaves were able to take over municipal 
councils. However, this renewal of leadership did not lead to major trans-
formations in the management of local affairs. Instead, the new leadership 
reproduced the political culture and practices of governance that prevailed 
before decentralisation.
The Fieldsites
Bankilaré and Gorouol are two adjoining municipalities situated in Western 
Niger between the river and the borders of Burkina Faso and Mali. The 
Songhay sedentary population practices rain-fed agriculture and flood-
recession farming along the banks of the river Gorouol. In regions where 
rain-fed agriculture is vulnerable to recurrent rain shortage and environmental 
degradation, flood-recession farming increases the subsistence security of the 
Songhay. Songhay farmers live in proximity to Fulbé and Kel Tamasheq groups, 
which used to be nomadic herders but recently became sedentary and started 
farming marginal lands. Historically, the Kel Tamasheq of the Niger Belt 
installed themselves on the Gourma bank (right bank of the river Niger) and 
gradually built powerful confederations that subjugated the Songhay, exacting 
tribute from them until the colonial conquest. Slavery played a central role in 
Songhay and Kel Tamasheq systems of production. Colonial domination at 
the beginning of the twentieth century put an end to the warrior economy, to 
the Kel Tamasheq supremacy and to slavery (Bernus, 1981). The country was 
‘pacified’, and the French administration used local chieftaincies to rule the 
region. Sedentary populations were ruled by canton chiefs (chefs de canton) and 
village chiefs, whereas nomadic ‘group chieftaincies’ (chefferies de groupement) 
were created to administer nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes (Kel Tamasheq 
and Fulbé).
The municipality of Kalalé is situated in the department of Borgou of 
Northern Benin, in the Sudano-Sahelian region that borders Nigeria. The 
population is composed essentially of Baatombu groups (often called Bariba), 
Boo and Fulbé (more commonly called ‘Peuls’, and incorporating the Gando). 
Other ethnic groups in this region play a marginal political role. Local 
producers clear this vast forested area to cultivate foodcrops and cash crops 
(cotton in particular) and to practise livestock husbandry (cattle, sheep and 
goats) which plays a central role in the Borgou economy and Northern Benin 
more generally. The Fulbé are traditionally identified with semi-nomadic 
herding, even though they also practise subsistence and commercial agricul-
ture. In pre-colonial times, Borgou was dominated by the Baatombu. The 
Fulbé, scattered in small groups and often without herds, provided herding 
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labour to the Baatonu and Boo. Gradually, by establishing patron–client 
relations with the warriors (wasangari) and peasants of the Baatonu and Boo, 
they gained access to land and formed their own herds of cattle. Both raided 
and protected by the wasangari, the Fulbé of Borgu remained dominated until 
the arrival of French colonialists. In the process of assigning each group a 
chief who would serve as intermediary between the administration and local 
populations, the French created an independent Fulbé chieftaincy ex nihilo3 
(Bierschenk, 1993; 1997). These three groups possessed slaves that are referred 
to, collectively, as ‘Gando’.
The Fulbé, Kel Tamasheq and Songhay, as several other Sahelo-Sudanese 
societies (Meillassoux, 1986), shared political and economic systems based on 
slavery. Pre-colonial conflicts and wars provided occasions to take prisoners 
who, unless they were freed, would become ‘slaves’. Their descendants became 
‘captives’.4 According to Rouch, ‘whatever their previous status, they became 
the property of whoever defeated them’ (Rouch, 1954, 48). Slaves constituted 
an important economic asset and they could be bought as farming, herding 
and domestic labour. Gradations of status existed also within the group of 
captives,5 further stratifying the social hierarchy. The colonial administration 
ended slavery well after the official abolition of 1905. In spite of its human-
istic and civilising ideology, the colonial administration turned a blind eye 
to the persistence of various forms of slavery for a long time, intervening 
only superficially when required by circumstances and/or by colonial interests 
(Bernus, 1981, 108–12; Hardung, 2002; Olivier de Sardan, 1976, 15–18). Slavery, 
therefore, remained generally tolerated, often under various attenuated forms, 
even though some effort was put into limiting the abuses of the chiefs and 
allowing slaves who moved away from their former masters to control their 
own labour and the profits derived from it. This situation allowed a number 
of slaves to emancipate themselves economically from their masters while, at 
times, maintaining relations of a patron–client kind, or continuing to accept 
various forms of subordination. Slavery thus went on beyond colonialism, and 
certain forms of master–slave relationships are still observable today.6
Here I shall not comment on the polemic7 initiated by Debord’s film (2002) 
and the report of Timidria and Anti-Slavery International (2003) on the endur-
ance of slavery in Niger and the magnitude of this phenomenon. It seems to 
me that, given the moral overtones of this subject, the ideological stance of the 
author tends to take precedence over methodological considerations.8 Suffice 
it to note that, in the majority of cases, the people that define themselves as 
‘slave’ (iklan, maccuBe, jiyaaBe, banniyey) in the course of an interview with an 
anthropologist or even a banal conversation in Niger or Benin are evoking 
their categorical status rather than their actual condition (people belonging 
to a master, working for him, lacking freedom of movement, etc.). In their 
survey on the state of slavery in Niger, Danda and Galy rightly point out 
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that ‘slavery in Niger is not completely abolished in practice, and even less in 
people’s mentality’ (2003, 106). Various recent reports indicate that this state-
ment would be equally appropriate for Northern Benin. This essay does not 
attempt to demonstrate the contemporary existence of situations of enslave-
ment. Rather, it uses three case studies to illustrate and analyse the endurance 
of ‘slavery’ in popular representations and the recent political mobilisation of 
groups of servile origin.
The Persistence of Stigma
The terms ‘Gando’ and ‘Bella’ designate respectively individuals and groups 
of servile origin among the ‘red Peuls’, Boo and Baatombu on the one hand, 
and the Kel Tamasheq societies of Western Niger on the other. These terms, 
borrowed from the Baatonu (language of the Baatombu) and from Songhay-
Zarma, regroup under a single denomination distinct social groups with 
different statuses: some belong to servile categories, others have been collec-
tively freed by their masters, others still are independent. In daily interactions 
with outsiders, the status nuances conveyed in Fulfulde and Tamasheq are 
commonly glossed over. Once these groups are collectively designated as ‘slave’ 
and their members are uniformly represented as stigmatised, mistreated and 
scorned, they acquire the misleading appearance of a homogeneous whole.
Among the Songhay-Zarma, the dichotomous reasoning applied to the 
ideological distinction between nobles and captives tends to erase internal 
nuances (Olivier de Sardan, 1984). The terms that designate individuals of 
servile status in Songhay or Zarma contexts are euphemised (almayaali9), 
codified (yegga or ‘centre-forward’10), omitted (at a number of meetings, I 
noted that speakers avoided naming people of servile origin, replacing a 
precise terminology with a commonly understood silence), or veiled (the 
ubiquitous term ‘thing’ replaces words that are too sensitive to be used in 
conversation). The majority of names designating servile groups in Songhay-
Zarma, Fulfulde and Tamasheq are currently taboo among intellectuals in 
urban contexts. This is notably the case with tam, horso, kongo and banniya 
in Songhay-Zarma.11 As a result of the work of the anti-slavery oganisation 
Timidria among the Kel Tamasheq of Niger the use of the term Iklan (sing. 
Akli) in public is strictly forbidden, under penalty of being openly confronted. 
Today the neutral term Kel Tamasheq, which encompasses all speakers of the 
Tamasheq language, or ‘black Tuareg’ are preferred to Iklan.12 Similarly, in Peul 
contexts (Boo or Baatonu of Northern Benin), some people prefer speaking 
of ‘black Peul’ rather than using the terms gannunkeeBe, maccuBe, Fulbé, yobu, 
yonobu, which describe with greater precision the particular status of these 
groups (cf. Hardung, 1997, 113–22). These names carry pejorative connotations 
that are often internalised by their carriers (Hardung, 1997, 117), and their overt 
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use in public situations induces considerable discomfort.
‘It is not appropriate to talk about this!’ This type of remark is common 
in the three groups considered here. A collective taboo surrounds the subject 
of slavery. When everybody knows, nothing has to be said. A set of symbolic 
elements function as constant reminders of the social differentiations partic-
ular to these societies both at the level of spatial organisation and at that of 
social interaction and self-representation (hairstyle, garments, jewellery, public 
demeanour, etc.), or in the organisation of work.
In the village or camp, social status is inscribed in the organisation of space. 
In Songhay rural villages nobles and ‘slaves’ live in separate neighbourhoods. 
In Bankilaré domestic slaves are generally situated west of the nobles’ camps. 
Instead, the Gando are usually settled at the periphery of the red Peul’s camps 
and the Baatonu or Boo villages. They are placed at the outskirts, towards the 
bush: in sum, they are physically banned from these societies of which they 
nonetheless constituted, and continue to constitute, a component essential to 
their development. Here and there some Songhay villages or Tamasheq camps 
are locally known for being composed only of slave descendants. As Bierschenk 
notes with regards to the Peul of North Benin, spatial structures play a consti-
tutive role in social processes, as they make readable, in space, the principles 
of social organisation, thereby ‘making those who inhabit these spaces believe 
that social constructs are “natural” and therefore inevitable, whereas they are 
nothing but the product of history13 and culture’ (Bierschenk, 1999, 196–97). 
This analysis could be extended to the three cases studied here. An example 
illustrates this point. In the Borgou a number of Gando farms located between 
Boo and Baatonu villages and Peul camps result from the auto-marginalisation 
operated by the Gando themselves. It is a phenomenon that occurs particularly 
among the Yonobu, who are children of the Boo and Baatombu assigned to the 
Peul at an early age because they were suspected of being sorcerers. The young 
Yonubu understands subsequently that he is not a full member of his adoptive 
Peul family (he cannot for example hope to marry a Peul woman), he is the 
genetic offspring of his Boo or Baatonu parents, who had rejected him and 
later wished to reintegrate him (in exchange for an ox given to his adoptive 
family). But his reintegration into the village proves difficult because, there, 
he is considered a Gando, an object of daily ridicule and scorn. Therefore he 
chooses to settle on the outskirts of other villages, creating new camps and 
clearing farms on unoccupied lands. ‘Neither Peul nor Baatombu’ (Hardung, 
1997), the Gando places himself somewhere in between these two identi-
ties. His position at the margins of dominant societies reflects an emotion-
ally charged psychological process that, according to some interpretations, is 
reflected in the meaning of the name ‘Gando’, namely ‘outside is best!’14
Moreover, in Songhay villages every marriage, baptism,15 religious celebra-
tion and burial16 reiterates a person’s place and rank in society. In Fulbé and 
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Kel Tamasheq cultures slave women do not wear the same clothes, jewel-
lery and hairstyle as noble women. Strict marriage endogamy also works as 
an expression of distance between different social categories. While noble 
men can marry women of servile status17 (ennobling them through marriage), 
marriage between a man of slave descent and a noble woman often remains 
unthinkable from the perspectives of both ‘nobles’ and ‘slaves’ who have inter-
nalised the dominant ideology.
The social stigma attached to slave descent is also manifested in the division 
of labour. In Kel Tamasheq societies a free man will resist doing any farming 
and other agricultural labour, as this work is traditionally considered debasing 
and reserved for slaves. In fact, this is one of the causes for the impover-
ishment of the Kel Tamasheq nobles in Bankilaré: having lost their animals 
following the droughts, the Imajeghen were unable to reconstitute their herds 
through the profits of farming, in contrast to their ‘slaves’ who found a source 
of prosperity in this work.18 This situation is less marked among the Fulbé of 
Northern Benin (where environmental conditions are not as harsh), who took 
up agriculture when their slaves were freed by the colonial administration. The 
social division of labour between elites and slave descendants is less flagrant in 
Songhay contexts, because here agriculture is traditionally practised by both 
groups. In urban centres, however, cleaning jobs and other demeaning tasks 
are reserved to slaves and foreigners (Hahonou, 2003).
If these aspects remain hidden or unspoken, they constitute tacit rules in 
the social and political arena. The whole of these ‘un-saids’ contributes to the 
production and reproduction of ‘ideological discrimination’ (Olivier de Sardan, 
1984, 201). If, historically speaking, what distinguishes the free man from the 
slave is nothing but misfortune (a kidnapped child, a man defeated in war, 
a person born to slave parents, a child ‘sorcerer’ born among the Baatombu, 
etc.), ideology associates pejorative physical, moral and behavioural attributes 
with servile status. The slave bears the heavy load of being at the same time 
‘defeated’, without lineage, without history, obscene, honourless, shameless 
and a liar.19 He cannot conduct himself as a free man. He is portrayed as 
the antithesis of the noble (see Riesman, 1974, on Fulbé slaves; Olivier de 
Sardan, 1976, on Songhay slaves). As the slave is owned, he or she is denied 
the capacity to own land, to lead prayer or command free individuals. The 
ideology of slavery characterises the slave as an eternal outsider (Kopytoff 
and Miers, 1977). This set of representations fosters a ‘social racism’ (Botte and 
Schmitz, 1994, 118) that is often extended to representations of slave descend-
ants, producing an inferiority complex (Hardung, 1997, 128) that counterbal-
ances the feeling of superiority of those of noble descent.
The internalisation of rules by different members of a community is flexible 
and varies across generations and levels of education. Referring to Western 
Niger, Rouch highlighted the resistance of slaves to emancipation by the 
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French administration, as it was considered that true liberation could only 
come from the master (1954, 49). Olivier de Sardan emphasised the obstacles 
to the achievement of ‘psychological independence’ by the slaves (1969, 47–48). 
Today in the rural milieu of Western Niger, as well as in Northern Benin, older 
ex-slaves, often illiterate, tend to perpetuate attitudes of loyalty, deference and 
respect towards their masters. The inferiority of one and superiority of the 
other are fully endorsed and, to return to Bierschenk’s notion, they appear as a 
‘natural’ social fact. Thus, in such contexts, slave and master will spontaneously 
employ terms and attitudes (body language) denoting their respective status. 
At the harvest, a slave may choose to offer a gift of cereals to his master to 
foster good relations with him in the future. Today these attitudes are induced 
less by actual subordination than by spontaneous or interested dispositions.
Now the masters are finished! They don’t exist anymore, in this area you 
only find them in Bankilaré [...] This is something we don’t like, because 
when you haven’t got a big man, whoever comes can take advantage of you. 
We prefer that he [the group chief ] remains here, among us. (Akli, chef de 
tribu Doufarafarak, 2003)
The colonial administration almost always appointed ‘traditional chiefs’ 
chosen from the ranks of the old masters. In contexts marked by the recur-
rent predations of state agents at the expense of rural populations, and more 
particularly of so-called ‘nomadic’ peoples, the ‘traditional’ chief is perceived 
as a protector, the sole recourse in the face of abuses of power, sometimes 
violent, enacted by the ‘wearers of uniform’ (police, soldiers, customs agents, 
environmental agents, etc.). His status, his knowledge of the administration 
(of which he is an essential cogwheel) and the privileged relationships that 
he maintains with his superiors (the sous-preféts in the first place) gives the 
chief an intermediary position.20 The chief is the privileged link between the 
state and local communities. All information, service or good directed to the 
population has to meet his preliminary approval. The chief has the role of the 
gatekeeper21 and can allow or deny the transmission of anything destined for 
his subjects at will. He articulates the relations between his subjects and state 
services and reduces (or extends) the distance that separates them, in exchange 
for a financial remuneration, the cost of access to citizenship (Hahonou, 2006, 
104–20).
In Northern Benin the derogatory connotations of the status of ‘slave 
descendant’ drove an entire generation of intellectuals who had achieved 
a successful political and bureaucratic career into hiding their origins (for 
example, by speaking Baatonu rather than Fulfulde, changing name, living in 
the city and severing links with their village of origin). This attitude, rooted 
in the Gando ‘identity complex’ (cf. Hardung, 1997) is not, however, the only 
possible option for intellectuals. A number of Gando and Bella intellectuals 
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have, on the contrary, opted for various forms of resistance. In the name of the 
ideals of justice and egalitarianism transmitted through modern education, 
Bella and Gando intellectuals in Niger formed political associations or parties 
to denounce the ongoing domination of former slaves by former masters and 
to claim a more equitable access to power. In Niger this resistance22 took 
the form of associational militancy in favour of the emancipation of people 
of servile origins and gave rise to political parties addressed specifically to 
the ‘black Tuareg’ electorate. In Benin Peuls and Gando formed a common 
front in a political movement that took the form of a Fulfulde linguistic and 
cultural seminar, until a large group of Gando distanced themselves from the 
red Peuls, and Gando leaders created their own movements.
The Difficult Task of the Political Representation of Slaves 
in the Songhay Milieu
In spite of the greater demographic weight of former slaves, since the estab-
lishment of party politics in Niger (1946) all the representatives of the National 
Assembly from Gorouol have been chosen from the ranks of the aristocracy. 
No slave descendant was able to emerge politically (Hahonou, 2004a and 
b). ‘Permanent juniors’23 in Songhay-Zarma societies, slaves are tradition-
ally excluded from power. The slave cannot envisage his accession to elder 
status. He will always remain dependent upon the master or his descendants. 
Power can only belong to a noble. In this context it is not surprising that 
former colonial soldiers of slave descent, who had been appointed chiefs by 
colonial administrators, were targeted by acute local criticism in the 1950s and 
1960s. From the point of view of the aristocratic ideology, there is a complete 
incompatibility between servile status and the exercise of political functions. 
Nowadays, in spite of change,24 these considerations are still widespread and 
the descendants of Songhay or Zarma slaves remain the object of discrimina-
tion in local political institutions.
The un-saids that structure the representations of ‘slaves’ among noble 
Songhay of Gorouol result in the quiet removal of ex-slaves from positions of 
responsibility through various manipulations. This occurs both in the constitu-
tion of local associations and of political parties:
It is true and always a delicate subject [the place of slaves]. When the 
(management committee) of the Boogu ONG was formed in 1992, a 
nobleman got the leadership through various manipulations. Yatakala being 
90% composed of captives, it was logical that they got the management 
roles at the level of presidency, vice-presidency... but after a covert debate 
we conspired to place myself in the best position. They said: ‘That’s it, we 
want you there because Yatakala must be on the frontline for the whole 
district, and we can’t put a “captive”! We have to set criteria so that you 
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are in front, and it’s up to you to meet these criteria’. So, we argued for 
the necessity to have someone capable of discussing with the Whites, the 
ONG, and reading documents.25 There it is: during that whole time it was 
them [slave descendants of the village] who proposed this to me. And it is 
in this manner that I came to office. (member of the Boogu ONG bureau, 
interview at Yatakala, district of Gorouol, Niger, 2003)
Olivier de Sardan’s writings on the ideological and symbolic survival of slavery 
in Songhay-Zarma societies remained essentially accurate (1984, 201–05). 
However, the multipartitism of the 1990s reshuffled local political forces. Just 
as in the 1990s young men of free origin tried to seize new political opportuni-
ties, the descendants of captives (mostly also young men) struggled to achieve 
political representation.
In Gorouol, if there are two major parties today, the MNSD and the PNDS, 
it is above all because of the problem of ‘castes’, and us… we understood 
this, and it’s one of the reasons why we approached the PNDS [...] In the 
MNSD, there are older people and those who don’t want to confront them. 
Us rebels, we side with the PNDS to try to change things. (a young politi-
cian of noble origin from Gorouol, Niamey 2003)
In Niamey the aristocratic intelligentsia militant within the MNSD Nassara26 
spread the rumour that the majority of the Songhay-Zarma of the Tillabéri 
region affiliated with the PNDS is of servile origin. Thus, every member of 
this party is suspected to be ‘casted’ or to sympathise with the illegitimate 
cause of those servile groups that are trying to overcome their conditions of 
origin. Thus, in Gorouol, social schisms are partly reflected in partisan demar-
cations. In this socio-cultural context national politicians are careful in their 
campaigns to subtly take advantage of existing social and political divisions to 
create their political clientage.
When I visit villages to ask people to support me, it must be known that I 
am noble… otherwise, those who consider themselves noble will not follow 
me. It’s not easy! In introducing myself along with someone ‘casted’, things 
reinforce each other, and both sides contribute to sustaining the party. (the 
same PNDS politician from Gorouol, Niamey, 2003).
Yet the PNDS party did not win in Gorouol at the municipal elections of 
2004. The MNSD Nassara, locally controlled by the aristocracy, gained all 
of the eleven seats of the municipal council. Hence all Songhay municipal 
representatives27 are aristocrats or free men. In spite of the opportunities for 
political representation that became available thanks to the recent municipal 
elections, the opposition between slave descendants (bagney) and nobles 
(borciney) failed to find expression in the Gouruol municipal council.
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The Political Emancipation of Kel Tamasheq of Servile Origin 
in Bankilaré
Referring to political representation among the Kel Tamasheq, Bourgeot notes 
that ‘slaves [...] are, by definition, deprived of both political and economic 
freedom’ (1995, 28). The ‘captive’ is situated outside politics (Bourgeot, 1995, 
39). The repeated crises that the Kel Tamasheq have endured since 1904, such 
as major droughts (1900–03, 1913–14, 1931–32, 1972–73, 1984–85) and hostile 
colonial policies,28 obliged masters to free a large part of their slaves (Iklan). 
The latter cleared the bush and became farmers or maintained their lives as 
nomadic shepherds, sometimes continuing to pay regular tributes to their 
masters. Some masters retained power over their economically emancipated 
slaves. Often this takes the form of protracted patron–client relationships29 
reflected in matters of political representation. By virtue of these relationships, 
the Iklan lend electoral support to their former Imajeghen masters. In the case 
of the Kel Tamasheq of Bankilaré, at the time of the legislative elections of 
1989–91, 1993–95, 1995–96 and 1996–99, all council seats had been monopolised 
by the customary and religious chieftaincies. The Kel Tamasheq customary 
chiefs were able to take advantage of the new political deal that followed from 
the process of democratisation. From 1989, the eldest member of the chiefly 
family of the Kel Igirer30 became a member of the National Assembly as his 
name was included in the national list presented by the MNSD party. From 
1992–93, the Kel Igirer chieftaincy (chefferie de groupement) also managed to 
profit from the status of special circumscription31 to monopolise the political 
representation of the group at the parliamentary level, with the support of the 
religious chiefs and to the detriment of the Iklan majority.32 The Imajeghen and 
their allies, the ineslimen (religious specialists), had to rely on their tributary 
and patron–client relationships with dependent groups (mostly imghad and 
iklan) to win the elections. Moreover, the ambiguous notion of ‘mixed’ status 
was used instrumentally to oppose the increasing weight of the Iklan in local 
politics. Thus, the two representatives elected in 1993, 1995 and 1996 shared the 
characteristic of being of mixed ancestry, born from taklit33 mothers who had 
been freed by their aneslim masters. This granted them a double claim to the 
support of free and Iklan people.
Nonetheless, in the space of a decade the local balance of forces between 
masters and slaves progressively changed to the advantage of the latter. In 
Bankilaré, at the end of 1999, the struggle for the emancipation of slave 
descendants led by the Timidria association34 finally resulted in the first slave 
descendant winning a seat in the National Assembly (cf. Hahonou, 2004a, 
41–43). Even if the elected member belonged to the ‘old school’, the challenge 
to the Imajeghen’s and Ineslimen’s political supremacy came primarily from 
younger generations. In addition to Timidria’s action, the election of an Akli 
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benefited from the support of certain politicians from Gorouol.35 However, the 
Iklan’s victory at the legislative elections of the end of 1999 should not suggest 
a lack of internal divisions. Even the Iklan are divided into opposing conserva-
tive and progressive groups. The militant action of Timidria is still scarcely 
understood by many of them. For others, arrangements with the masters 
present more advantages than an uncertain struggle for  emancipation:
The people of Tahoua [referring to the Timidria association, whose 
national president is from Tahoua] come to insult people, to divide them by 
supporting the struggle against the ‘Reds’. The Timidria, after their missions 
in Bankilaré, they tell women to take off the bracelets that they wear on 
their feet. They are in their vehicles and they stop to forcibly remove the 
bracelets from the women. And then, they also tell the women to remove 
their traditional hairstyles36 and their clothes typical of tiklan women. These 
are the ‘worst slaves’ of Tahoua, who come to distribute money. One day, 
an old woman, one of the wet-nurses37 of a son of the old-man [the group 
chief ], replied to them: ‘If you want me to remove the bracelets, then change 
the color of my skin first!’ (Kel Tamasheq politician of servile status, closely 
related to the chiefs of the Bankilaré group, 2003).
Until 200438 Timidria’s action in Bankilaré remained fairly discrete and 
localised (focused upon the camps where the association leaders have relatives), 
often misunderstood, and even opposed by the creation of a  development 
association39 led by an Akli loyal to the chefferie of the Kel Igirer. Often assimi-
lated to a political party, the ideology of Timidria seems dissonant with popular 
representations of politics, development aid or Muslim morality.
1st person: ‘Yes, it is slaves who joined forces [Timidria] to fight to end 
slavery.
2nd person: Really? You know, we hadn’t even understood this. We thought 
it was a party. [...]
1st person: Hasn’t slavery been over for a long time?
2nd person: Maybe it’s just against saying that word.
1st person: It’s in the Qu’ran. Unless they’re going to make the Qu’ran disap-
pear so that they don’t encounter the word. Slavery disappear? That would 
mean that these people are against the Qu’ran, against God. (extract from a 
discussion between two Kel Tamasheq women, Balleyara, 2003).
The message of Timidria, which challenges the verbal discrimination against 
slave descendants (the pejorative character of the term Bella or Iklan used to 
discredit and demean a person morally), is misunderstood. Neither develop-
ment broker nor political party, Timidria has long remained an atypical actor 
in local politics. In other regions of Niger, politically engaged development 
brokers were quicker to reposition themselves at the political level (Tidjani 
Alou, 2000b, 303).
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The formation of a political party of slave descendants, the PRD Mahiba 
– parti tan Iklan or ‘slave party’ (as the Imajeghen call it) – seen as the political 
wing of Timidria, marked an important symbolic turn, even if they could not 
yet impose themselves on the local and national political chessboards. The PRD 
Mahiba was created in 1996 from a schism of the PUND Salama, itself origi-
nating from a division with the UDPS Amana, a political wing of the Touareg 
rebellion.40 The three parties have in common the fact of being supported 
primarily by a Kel Tamasheq electorate. Following the Zinder congress of 
the PUND Salama (1995), a party of militants originally from the Tillabéri 
department detached itself from the leader Akoli Dawal41 and created the 
PRD Mahiba. For the militants of Tillabéri (at the time, the administrative 
capital of the department of Western Niger), joining the PUND Salama had 
initially been motivated by a concern with the political under-representation 
of the Kel Tamasheq and their under-development compared to the Songhay. 
Since its creation, the party has been presided over by a native of Tillabéri. For 
the Bankilaré area, two state officers from the ‘black Tuareg community’ were 
its representatives (one of them was the first general secretary of the party, 
and it is said that the other owes his promotion in the state apparatus to his 
membership in the PRD Mahiba). In Bankilaré the electorate of the PRD 
generally followed the successive political memberships of its leaders: MNSD 
and ANDP, then PRD, and more recently MNSD (1999). Although it did not 
win the elections,42 the emergence of the PRD Mahiba marked an important 
step in people’s mindsets as an attempt to break with the former order. In this 
power quest, which follows the logic of ‘political nomadism’ (or opportunism), 
the return to the MNSD has above all allowed access to the financial resources 
required by the expensive and uncertain adventure of electoral campaigns.43
On the death of the first Bella representative of Bankilaré in 2001, his 
substitute (député suppléant), an active member of Timidria and of the PRD 
Mahiba, replaced him in office. Following allegations of corruption, the 
latter was disqualified from participating in the legislative elections of 2004. 
His successor, supporting the MNSD Nassara, was another Bella activist of 
Timidria, coming from Bankilaré and sympathising with the PRD Mahiba. 
This politician was a doctor in ethnology who taught at the University of 
Niamey and played a decisive role in the municipal election campaign of July 
2004 and the formation of the municipal executive bureau of which he is said 
to pull the strings.
The municipal council of Bankilaré which was elected at the end of 2004, 
after the resumption of the July elections (due to frauds denounced by the 
parties in competition), is composed of eleven elected representatives and two 
members by right: the deputy of Bankilaré and the chief of the Kel Igirer 
group. It is heavily dominated by the MNSD (8 of 11 seats), who won the 
bulk of Bella votes, whereas the traditional chiefs and their allies, affiliated 
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with the CDS, had to settle for three seats only (of which one was Bella). The 
post of mayor of Bankilaré was accorded to a slave descendant from Bankilaré 
employed at the Prefecture of Téra. Beyond having the support of the local 
member of Parliament, the MNSD candidates in the municipal administra-
tion benefited from the financial support of a Pullo who was originally from 
Bankilaré and became influential at the national level, acting as advisor to the 
prime minister, Hama Amadou, for several years.
Timidria, which had been in favour of accelerating the process of decentrali-
sation ‘likely to offer marginalised groups such as former slaves the possibility 
of taking part in the local administration of public affairs and to progressively 
erase the stereotypes that oppress them’ (Dandah and Galy, 2003, 72), clearly 
played a central role in the process of the emancipation of slave descendants 
in tamasheq contexts.
The Historical Revenge of the Gando of Kalalé
The political marginalisation of the Fulbé of the Borgou dates from the 
pre-colonial era, from the time when they were clients of the Baatombu 
and the Boo. Colonialism had provisionally interrupted their dependence 
and exploitation. In creating fulbé chieftaincies (which did not exist before), 
the colonial administration had allowed them to establish direct relations 
with the state apparatus. The suppression of the chieftaincy in 1972 under 
a Marxist-Leninist regime constituted a step backward for this politically 
under-represented group. Exploited by the post-colonial administration, 
victims of all sorts of extortions by the military, civil servants and a corrupt 
justice, discriminated against in disputes arising from the damage caused by 
their animals on the fields of the Baatombu and Boo,44 regularly deceived 
by unavoidable local intermediaries (the ‘district chiefs’, ‘delegates’ and other 
‘village chiefs’), the Fulbé remained locked in a stoicism rooted in the fulbé 
notion of senteene.45 For a long time, the Fulbé accepted the marginalisation 
and the injustices bestowed upon them. It has even been possible to talk of 
‘auto-marginalisation of the Peul’ (Bierschenk, 1995, 462; cf. Hardung, in this 
volume), who until recently stayed away from politics, thus being unable to 
end the humiliations they suffered. They attribute their exploitation to the 
historical error they committed by fleeing the ‘school of Whites’ (janirde 
batuure). Like the Songhay or Kel Tamasheq chiefs, the ‘red Peuls’ preferred 
sending to school the children of their slaves rather than their own. Their 
children’s lack of schooling deprived them of ‘intellectuals’46 capable of repre-
senting their interests vis-à-vis the State and other groups that exploit them 
(Bierschenk, 1999, 208–09).
The collective awakening of the Fulbé occurred in December 1987 with 
the birth of the Laawol Fulfulde movement (lit. ‘the way of the Fulbé’). 
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Considered incapable of collective action, the Fulbé generated considerable 
surprise when they organised a massive gathering in Kandi, district-capital 
of Northern Benin, and expressed their claims in the course of a linguistic 
seminar (Bierschenk, 1992; Guichard, 1990). This event was made possible by 
the post-1980s change in Benin state politics against the earlier centralising 
approach and towards the promotion of internal diversity of national ethnicities 
and cultures (Bierschenk, 1995, 462–67). This opportunity was initially seized 
by a small group of fulbé intellectuals who, since the early 1980s, had joined 
an evangelical priest’s struggle to promote literacy among the rural Fulbé of 
Northern Benin. Thanks to the support of some politicians, and in particular 
of the person who would become the president of the Laawol Fulfulde and 
who, at the time, was national deputy, the provisional committee obtained the 
authorisations and material support necessary to organise the Kandi seminar. 
At the local level, the huge mobilisation of ‘Peul’ and Gando, manifested 
through the support of traditional chiefs, massive popular participation and 
important material contributions (supplies, livestock, cash), was determinant 
in making the event happen. During the seven days of the conference, various 
commissions elaborated different themes, such as ‘the origin of the Peuls of 
Borgou’, ‘the life of the Peul herder’, ‘schooling’, etc. Literacy and education 
were established as ‘key to the emancipation of nationality’ (i.e. of the Fulbé 
group47). Through literacy, education would contribute to the reduction of the 
marginalisation and exploitation suffered by Fulbé for decades: ‘The unedu-
cated man is a blind man!’
The great Fulbé movement of Northern Benin that initially reflected a 
reaction against exploitation by the HaaBe48 (the ‘others’, the ‘non-Peuls’) 
finally highlighted a different form of exploitation: that of Fulbé by Fulbé. This 
consideration led rapidly to internal disagreements in the Laawol Fulfulde. 
Thus, the second conference held in Kalalé in 1990 was disrupted by the 
participants of the first. The same ills listed three years earlier were still going 
on. Literacy and education, always seen as avenues to progress, had hardly 
advanced as a result of bureaucratic inertia. On one side, young people expressed 
consternation vis-à-vis the elders’ management style. The latter established the 
committee as a sort of traditional tribunal which ‘settled family disputes over 
wife stealing and the like, rather than the problem of Peul access to education’. 
Moreover, the funds of the committee, derived from various contributions 
(gifts of livestock, membership fees and donations, state-funded grants, etc.), 
had been embezzled by various members of the bureau. The youths who had 
criticised the elders of the committee were ostracised from the organisation. 
Instead, the Gando, frustrated by their continuing marginalisation, reiter-
ated their demands to the committee. Gando intellectuals realised that the 
‘Peul’ did not consider them full members of their group49 and that their 
integration in the Laawol Fulfulde was merely a façade of unity, behind which 
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divisions remained profound. Thus, the bureau of the committee remained 
dominated by the ‘red Peuls’ to the detriment of the ‘blacks’. In preparation 
for the Banikoara conference of 1997, Gando delegations were received by 
the bureau committee in an attempt to overcome disagreements: ‘They evoke 
Peul origins50 and they don’t talk about the Gando. They call us to finance 
conferences, but that’s all! They cheat us and still dominate us...’ Few things 
changed after this conference, and the expression of Gando frustration grew 
more intense as time went on.
In 2000–01 (after the death of the Laawol Fulfulde president), a restricted 
meeting between Gando and ‘Peul’ leaders took place in Parakou (the admin-
istrative centre of the Borgou prefecture, where a number of intellectuals work 
and live) to ensure that Gando representation be guaranteed in the manage-
ment committee of the Laawol Fulfulde. However, it was another ‘red’ who 
took the leadership of the organisation. In spite of an agreement in principle 
following the meeting, the Gando soon afterwards detached themselves from 
the joint movement and formed their own organisations following the model 
of the linguistic conferences. This is how in this period the Idi Waadi associa-
tion (‘what we want has taken place’) came to be formed at the following of 
Gando leaders from Nikki. A number of twin organisations that opposed 
the old order also emerged at the local level: Djanati (‘peace finally come’) 
in Kandi, Semmee Allah (‘the force of God’) in Kalalé, etc. These organisa-
tions served as political platforms for Gando leaders running in the municipal 
elections of December 2002– January 2003.
Semmee Allah is a branch of the Laawol Fulfulde created by Ourou 
Sé Guéné, a college professor from Kalalé. Although the name evokes the 
accomplishment of the will of God, the group identifies with physical strength 
(semmee) and work (golle), which are the positive values emphasised by the 
Gando to distinguish themselves from other groups, as noted by Hardung 
(1997, 129–35). These values constitute a key element in the contemporary 
construction of Gando identity. After the colonial abolition of slavery, former 
slaves used their physical labour to further emancipate themselves. The Gando 
of Borgou quickly became wealthier than their former Peul and Baatombu 
masters (Lombard, 1965). But it is above all education, intellectual work, that 
allowed the Gando to progressively achieve a reversal of power relations. 
Through education the Gando gradually achieved state functions (Hardung, 
1997, 137). Through education and knowledge of the past they were able to 
accept a collective identity until then defined essentially by the discourses and 
practices of exclusion of other groups (Boo, Baatombu and ‘Peuls’). Gando 
intellectuals used their individual experience and understanding of the situa-
tion to help the whole group to emancipate itself and reappropriate an ethnic 
identity. This process of ‘ethnicisation’, to borrow Bierschenk’s expression (1993), 
is now advanced among the Gando. This group, of which Hardung said that 
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internal status differences constituted ‘factors hindering group cohesion and 
the emergence of a collective identity’ (1997, 117), was able to seize the oppor-
tunities offered by the processes of democratisation and  decentralisation.
Just like the Kel Tamasheq of Bankilaré of servile origin, it was through 
associationism that the Gando began their process of political emancipation. 
Initially integrated in the unitary Laawol Fulfulde movement, where they 
could not fully express themselves,51 the Gando progressively and collectively 
developed an ethnic identity of their own: ‘neither Baatombu, nor Peul’, but 
Gando. They took control of an ideological difference that until then had 
placed them outside, or banned them from the Boo, Baatonu and Peul socie-
ties. Nowadays, they assert their distinctiveness, confirming the tendency 
noticed by Hardung (1997, 137–38). As their repeated negotiations with the 
bureau dominated by Laawol Fulfulde aristocrats failed, they created an alter-
native movement founded on their ethnic uniqueness, particularly vis-à-vis 
the Peuls. As had happened with the organisers of the first linguistic seminar, 
the intellectuals who initiated the Gando movements became its leaders.
The composition of the Kalale municipal council reflects the demographic 
preponderance of the Gando:52 of 17 municipal seats, nine are occupied by 
Gando. Orou Sé Guéné53 – head of the RUND party54 – fought his electoral 
campaign, working closely with his Gando ‘brothers’, under the banner of 
Gando political emancipation, struggle against the mismanagement of the 
cotton business, protection against the iniquities of the HaaBe, etc. He won 
seven seats and made a coalition with the delegates of two minor parties 
which had four seats in all, becoming the first elected mayor in the Kalalé 
municipality at the beginning of 2003.55 However, the election of Orou Sé 
Guéné did not depend merely on the electoral weight of the Gando, but also 
on his capacity to recruit voters from other ethnic groups (Boo, Baatombu 
and other minorities).
If, for the descendants of the local aristocracy, the victory of a Gando threw 
shame on Kalalé, a slave descendant at the head of a collectivity was not an 
entirely new occurrence in Borgou. In Nikki, a neighbouring locality that had 
belonged to the Baatombu kingdom, a man of slave descent had achieved 
the highest position in local authority a few years earlier (at the time56 Nikki 
was a sub-prefecture). Yet this historical precedent was short-lived because 
the sub-prefect was quickly replaced by a Nikki ‘prince’, promoted by the 
Minister of Interior Affairs. The latter seized the occasion of the expulsion of 
the Gando sub-prefect to reiterate publicly the incompatibility of individuals 
of servile status with leadership functions. This case caused great controversy 
in the Gando community of the Borgou, which took its revenge a few years 
later by ‘voting ethnically’ on the occasion of the municipal elections. Hence, 
the rise to power of slave descendants belongs to a tendency older than the 
recent trend induced by decentralisation.
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New Elites, Old Forms of Governance
The appearance of municipalities in the institutional and political landscape 
of Benin and Niger is a recent phenomenon. One might think that it has led 
to the renewal of the local ruling elite. But in fact municipalities constitute 
only partial innovations, as local political arenas were already governed by 
a decentralised administration (the sub-prefectures, the postes administratifs), 
by a group of associative-style organisations and by the so-called chefferie 
traditionelle. Therefore, municipalities did not fill a political, administra-
tive, organisational and institutional vacuum. Rather, they added themselves 
to multiple existing organisations in which local elites had already carved 
their niches. These multiple actors of local governance managed economic 
enterprises (organisations of cotton producers and herders) and the transport 
system (syndicates of transporters), they participated in public investment, 
administrated communities, etc. They immediately tried to take over the 
municipal bodies to which all of these sectors were legally transferred. On the 
one hand, the officers of the under-financed local administration converged 
around municipalities (to which the bulk of the resources of previous decen-
tralised institutions had been transferred). Thus, former sub-prefects, general 
secretaries and other administrative officers of the sub-prefectures, as well as 
agents of technical services of the state, threw themselves into the political 
struggle for the first communal elections. Some of them were able to assume 
the main executive positions of the new municipalities (mayors and adjunct 
mayors). The profiles of newly elected municipal staff suggest that the leaders 
of the main local organisations took advantage of the political influence they 
had acquired within their old institutions to access new influential roles in the 
municipal councils (Hahonou, 2006b). Hence there wasn’t an entire renewal 
but rather a displacement of local elites to new institutional positions. The 
migration of political actors to municipalities is inscribed in the broader 
transfer of com petences and resources occasioned by the decentralisation 
process in Benin and Niger.
As local elites conquered the municipalities, they transposed their concep-
tions and practices of administration of public and collective resources to 
them. Thus, the administration of decentralised collectivities follows the 
logics that prevailed before their establishment in the administration of the 
sub-prefectures as much as in the organisations of cotton growers, water 
management committees, etc. Municipal governance inherited the dynamics 
of the political culture and moral economy which was anchored in local insti-
tutions in charge of the allocation of common property resources. These local 
practices are characterised by the diversion of funds, the systematic recourse to 
‘over-billing’, the non-reimbursement of credit, various forms of neo-patrimo-
nialism and nepotism, forms of clientelism that determine the redistribution 
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of resources... These strategies are generalised and observable in all activities 
and all sectors.
In Benin the cotton sector is fairly indicative of these dynamics, which 
are part of the ‘corruption complex’ (Olivier de Sardan, 1996, 99) and rooted 
in forms of representation of the management of common resources down 
to the village level. ‘In the village, becoming secretary of the village collec-
tive has become the ultimate ambition of the young students’ (the mayor of 
a Borgou municipality, June 2006). The secretary of the village cooperative 
(Groupement Villageois or GV) is responsible for the administration of all 
inputs related to cotton farming (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, country credits) 
as well as the management of incomes. The concrete aspects of these tasks 
allow the secretary and the other members of the management committee 
to enrich themselves under everyone’s eyes with impunity.57 Since the 1990s 
the conspicuous consumption of resources misappropriated by the admin-
istrative staff of producers’ associations (funerary ceremonies, purchase of 
vehicles and audio and video equipment, etc.) has provoked the young cotton 
farmers’ condemnation of the practices of the elders. These young, educated 
groups dismissed the old administration or formed new associations, where 
they reproduced the same practices and perpetuated the same ‘model’ of rapid 
social achievement.
In all the North, it’s like that. And it’s tied to corruption. In certain GV, the 
presidents have been in office since 1984, when the texts allow for three-year 
mandates. But they don’t want to leave. As everybody wants to be the boss, 
new networks are created so that people can lead! (former director of the 
Municipal Union of Kalale Cotton Producers, current 1st adjunct to the 
mayor of Kalalé, June 2006)
In Kalalé Gando leaders also fit in this dynamic of management turnover 
of the producers’ associations. Of 74 producers’ associations, more than half 
are Gando. It was to some of these groups that the Gando leaders, such as 
Ourou Sé Guéné, turned to finance their campaigns and enrol voters for the 
municipal elections of 2002. These associative organisations are real political 
instruments that allow for rapid personal enrichment, but also, and most of 
all, constitute a platform for the establishment of patron–client networks. In 
fact, the leaders of these structures have the tacit mandate to redistribute the 
associations’ resources to their supporters, who turn to them when they need 
protection and/or assistance. Redistribution occurs primarily among relatives, 
as well as friends and allies recruited from within one’s social or ethnic group. 
Neither the management of associations of Gando producers nor that of 
Gando cultural and identity movements (Idi Waadi, Djanati, Semmee Allah) 
could avoid this dominant model. ‘They [the Gando] created their own way 
but they made the same mistakes by copying the behaviours of their masters. 
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They did the same thing, if not worse!’ (‘red’ Peul, dissident member of the 
Laawol Fulfulde, April 2007).
These associative logics and practices are reproduced in municipal institu-
tions, which, because of the competences and resources transferred to them, 
are seen as new income opportunities by local actors. Whatever the rhetoric 
used to access municipal power, the administration practices of elected Gando 
leaders do not differ from those of other administrations. They had not yet 
reached the end of their first mandate when this was already clear for all to see: 
’80 per cent of the mayors came to enrich themselves!’ (officer of the National 
Association of Benin Municipalities, June 2006).
Since 2005, and after having already evaded dismissal by buying off some 
of the municipal advisors,58 the Gando mayor of Kalalé was deposed following 
a ‘vote of defiance’ by the municipal council (14 votes against 3). As with a 
number of other mayors of Borgou, the mayor of Kalalé was blamed for his 
‘individualistic management’ (gestion solitaire), that is, his tendency to keep for 
himself the benefits of his dominant position, ‘binging alone’ and excluding 
other municipal councillors from opportunities to ‘devour the till’ (i.e. municipal 
budget). His dismissal, orchestrated by central state powers via the prefecture 
of Parakou, was part of a series of depositions that affected particularly, but 
not exclusively, the Northern municipalities and was a political move aimed at 
destabilising the opposition before the presidential elections of March 2006. 
However, the transactions generated by these dynamics suggest that the redis-
tribution of resources to political supporters had not been satisfactory from 
the viewpoint of the municipal council. In effect, it is generally expected that 
a mayor, ‘put in business’ by his allies in the council, will ensure an equitable 
distribution. In the political culture of municipalities, the ‘accountability’ of 
mayors is defined in terms of their capability to redistribute goods and services 
to other elected officials, as well as to their electors.
In Bankilaré or in Gorouol municipal institutions had only just been set 
up before embezzlement was already a routine affair. As municipalities were 
perceived primarily as a way to ‘stuff one’s belly’, the embryos of municipal 
institutions established in Gorouol and Bankilaré sufficed to satisfy the objec-
tives envisioned by local elected officials: to share municipal resources among 
themselves. In the municipalities of Benin and Niger considered in this essay 
the practices and modalities of distribution are very similar. In Kalalé and 
in the majority of the Benin municipalities executive power is limited to 
the posts of mayor and his adjuncts. The executive committee had to find a 
way to involve the other members of the municipal council in the manage-
ment of resources. Some of the councillors (generally those belonging to the 
local branch of the governing party) were named ‘district chiefs’ and made 
responsible for the collection of municipal taxes at village markets. This allows 
two-thirds of the council to participate directly in the collection of local funds 
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and to ‘dip’ into the ‘municipal pot’.59 In Niger the councillors of Gorouol 
decided to assign their substitutes to the position of collectors of market 
taxes. This decision, formalised by an ordinance signed by the mayor, ensures 
the provision of ‘political rewards’ expected by the substitutes. The decision 
was positively welcomed by the national direction of the MNSD Nassara, 
Niger’s governing party. It is common knowledge in Niger that the market 
tax collectors, whose official remuneration should be a percentage of the taxes 
collected, actually set their own ‘salary’.60 Of course these measures, taken 
by the municipal councils, are hardly compatible with the stated objective of 
increasing municipal income.
Subsitutes: they are nothing in the municipality. But this, it’s the spirit of 
sharing, it’s to maintain their respect. It presupposes that the councilors fatten 
themselves, and give tickets to substitutes in compensation. It’s a political 
recompense! (Chief of the Gorouol district, Kolmane, September 2006)
 This mess is not unique to these two communes [Gorouol and Bankilaré], 
you also find it in Méhana and Dargol, it happens a little bit everywhere! 
(General Secretary of the Téra prefecture, Niger, September 2006)
In the practice of municipal administration, being of slave descent or not 
is inconsequential. Municipalities are political arenas endowed with resources 
that ought to be seized. In Kalalé or Bankilaré, belonging to a servile category 
is no longer an obstacle for accessing these resources, and it might, in fact, be 
an asset (identity as a political resource and as a means to gain votes). Those 
who had to settle for the neck of the sheep can now obtain choice cuts.61 It is 
in this sense that a historical revenge has taken place.
The relations established between governors and governed in the munici-
palities are in continuity with past habits. They are characterised by a ‘feudal’ 
political regime, that is, following Maquet (1961), they are relations organised 
‘between two parties with unequal power, relations of patronage on one side, 
and of loyalty and service on the other’. What counts most is the personal tie 
between patron and client. Yet in most cases today the patron is no longer 
the master and the client not necessarily the slave or vassal. The examples 
discussed above show that these patronage relations are highly variable 
(alliances between young nobles and slaves, struggles internal to chiefly 
groups, opportunism of migrants, factionalism) and unstable (contestations, 
counter-alliances, depositions). Access to local powers by people of servile 
origins obliged to protect their voters will probably have an impact on their 
social integration (intermarriages, political and religious functions and roles). 
It will initiate a centripetal movement of these groups from the margins to the 
centre of society, bearing witness to the progressive erasure of servile stigma 
and gradual access to citizenship on the part of servile groups, a process that 
political anthropology will have to investigate and document.




From the perspective of the aristocratic ideology, which is still widespread 
in local societies (including among individuals and groups belonging to less 
stratified societies), slave status is seen as incompatible with political leadership. 
Relegated to the lowest ranks and the least desirable jobs, slave descendants 
remained stigmatised and until recently marginalised in the political space. 
The recent municipal elections in Benin and Niger highlighted a number of 
meaningful social and political changes. The principle by which the social 
position of a group may entail its marginalisation at the economic and political 
level seems not to apply any more. In various contexts, groups that appeared to 
be the least likely to exercise power have finally seized it. Today in Bankilaré 
the aristocratic elites are a small minority in the municipal council, which is 
largely dominated by people of iklan status, and in Kalalé there isn’t a single 
Pullo nobleman on the council. On the contrary, noble Songhay still dominate 
the municipal political arena in Gorouol.
Differences across contexts (Songhay of Gorouol vs. Fulbé of Kalalé and 
Kel Tamasheq of Bankilaré) indicate that democratisation and decentralisa-
tion per se are not sufficient conditions for the emergence of marginal groups 
in local political arenas. They merely constitute favourable frameworks for the 
expression of dynamics already at work at the local and global levels, including 
long-term transformations of past hierarchies, political hegemonies and 
subordinate relations in stratified societies. The introduction of new rules of 
access to political power (equality of social actors as voters, electoral premium 
on demographic weight, role of education) is likely to bring about a profound 
transformation of the social order. New hierarchies and social inequalities are 
beginning to take shape: the political leaders of servile origin dominate local 
political arenas and have started to impose themselves at the national level, to 
the detriment of former masters progressively relegated to a political minority. 
A counter-ideology affirms itself and new legitimacies appear: ‘Who is a slave 
today? If the noble is illiterate and poor, he will become the slave of a slave!’ 
(Gando leader of Kalalé, May 2007).
In the contemporary discourses and representations of the majority of 
Gando or Iklan, slavery figures as bound to poverty. This association changes 
the original meaning of the institution. As relations of patronage are no 
longer based on traditional status hierarchies, the question of citizenship will 
undoubtedly pose itself as primary. However, in spite of the appearance of new 
actors in positions they did not occupy before and of the social ‘reshuffling’ this 
entails, uses of power and administrative practices tend to remain the same. 
The struggle for change is less about changing the modes of local governance 
than it is about the gaining of a share of political power by those who had 
been excluded from it.
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The study of the political emancipation of slave descendants requires a 
long-term approach. Colonialism and the abolition of slavery incontestably set 
a break with the past, allowing the physical liberation and economic emanci-
pation of slaves without truly disrupting social hierarchies. In Kel Tamasheq 
and Fulbé societies the political emancipation of (male) slaves occurred in the 
broader context of the impoverishment of the masters, who constitute a small 
minority of the population, and the relative economic ease of the ex-slaves; 
the dissolution of tributary and dependent relations; and most importantly 
the development of movements defending the interests of social groups that 
were long subjugated (the Tuareg rebellion; the creation of Timidria in Niger; 
the Fulbé cultural and linguistic movement; as well as the Gando associations 
of Northern Benin). These political arenas functioned as privileged spaces for 
the emergence of collective consciousness in the dominated class. Within it 
the psychological passage from the ‘identity complex’ to the affirmation of 
the self achieved at first by individual intellectuals transformed itself in a 
collective movement that undermined past ideological constructs. The intel-
lectuals of servile origin who became leaders of these movements were able 
to develop or strengthen patron–client relations based on kinship, ethnicity 
and social proximity. They developed an emancipation rhetoric that reversed 
the previous discourse. The new ‘enemy’ is easily recognisable: in Bankilaré 
it is ‘red’, it collects taxes, extorts its subjects rather than protecting them, 
monopolises politics without redistribution; in Kalalé it is again the ‘reds’, who 
at an earlier stage had substituted themselves for the HaaBe, who despise the 
Gando, cheat them and exploit them. A wind of revolution and revenge has 
blown. Politically active former slaves seem anxious to restructure traditional 
hierarchies and erase progressively the social stigma cast upon them.
A new egalitarian ideology that values instruction, economic power and 
demographic (electoral) weight today dominates the aristocratic ideology. It is 
improbable that the Songhay of Gorouol will be able to resist the changes that 
have transformed neighbouring societies once a community of slave descend-
ants is able to affirm itself there, too, by breaking silences and taboos. These 
societies are witnessing profound socio-political changes that increase the 
complexity of identities, progressively transforming local governance, access to 
citizenship and ways of practising politics locally and in Africa as a whole.
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Notes
 1 Translated from French to English with the valuable and much-appreciated help of 
Benedetta Rossi.
 2 Local actors often employ the contrast red/black (or its variant white/black) to 
characteriSe ethnic and moral distinctions. The ethnonyms ‘Tuareg’ or ‘Peul’ usually 
evoke ‘reds’. From the point of view of intellectuals of servile origin, the politically 
correct term to designate all social categories of their society is Kel Tamasheq, that is, 
individuals who speak the Tamasheq language. Similarly, in Fulbé society (the term 
Peul, used in French, comes from ‘Pullo’, sing. of Fulbé), there is the same emphasis 
on colour distinctions (exaggerated and empirically unfounded). People talk of ‘red 
Peuls’ and ‘black Peuls’. These categories have in common that they speak the same 
Fulfulde language. There is no such distinction in Zarma and Songhay societies where 
masters and slaves have the same complexion. Here I shall use the emic terms Fulbé 
and Kel Tamasheq to designate the whole population of native speakers of Fulfude or 
Tamasheq. I use the term ‘Peul’ to highlight the contrast with the Gando group.
 3 Village and camp chiefs were designated locally, as well as a superior Peul regional 
chief (Bierschenk, op. cit.).
 4 Meillassoux (1986, 325) uses the term ‘captive’ in the different sense of the person who 
has been captured but has not yet been acquired by a master. It is generally acknowl-
edged that at the beginning of the 1900s the difference between ‘slave’ and ‘captive’ in 
official colonial discourse was broadly artificial and tied to the ideology prevalent at 
the time. In current Nigerien French usage, the terms ‘slave’ and ‘captive’ tend to be 
used interchangeably. In this essay, I use the term ‘slave’ to imply a particular social 
status: categorical slavery.
 5 For an exhaustive description of different servile categories, see Rouch (1954) and 
Olivier de Sardan (1976; 1984) for the Songhay; Bernus (1963; 1981) for the Kel 
Tamasheq of the Niger belt; Baldus (1969; 1977) and Hardung (1997) for the Fulbé of 
North Benin.
 6 I was able to observe cases of domestic servitude among Nigerien Kel Tamasheq, 
and particularly the Ineslimen (religious specialists) and certain Imajeghen (warrior 
aristocracy) at the outskirts of Bankilaré. Florence Boyer’s writings (2005) also attest the 
occurrence of this phenomenon among the Ineslimen of Ingui— Ezak, near Bankilaré. 
Such situations are still widespread in various regions of the country and it is not 
uncommon to come across herders of servile status taking care of the herds of their 
‘master’. Today these dependent relations are marked by ambiguity (Hahonou, 2006).
 7 The documentary ‘Masters and Slaves’, directed by B. Debord in 2002, stages ‘slave 
liberations’ by the anti-slavery association Timidria. These freed ‘slaves’ are female 
‘domestics’ who serve in the home of their masters where they carry out various kinds 
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of household chores, and water and wood transport, without being paid. Both this 
film and the report by Timidria and the ONG Anti-Slavery International (2003) were 
contested by the Nigerien intelligentsia and several anthropologists.
 8 This also applies to Botte’s 2003 article on Nigerien slavery, based on highly contro-
versial evidence that fuelled a heated debate. ‘Negationists’ deny the contemporary 
relevance of slavery, claiming that the ‘proofs’ supplied to document the phenomenon 
are inadequate. To be sure, it is misleading to say that in Bankilaré ‘the iklan are 
forbidden to drill wells, reserved for “nobles”; they must settle for a contaminated 
lake...’ (Botte, 2003, 129). On a short research tour accompanied by members of 
Timidria, Botte was probably unable to gather adequate information. In fact, some 
tiklan women from neighbouring camps do take water from the lake, but they do so 
primarily to avoid having to pay the fee collected at the well by an administrator, who 
happens to be of slave descent. Water here is provided in drums of 20 litres or barrels 
of 200 litres, whatever the social status of the clients. Yet the social division of tasks is 
so marked that it is only the iklan who go to fetch water at the well, just as only tiklan 
women grind millet.
 9 The term almayaali refers to all dependent groups (cf. Olivier de Sardan, 1982).
 10 The term yegga (which designates the number ‘nine’ in Zarma-Songhay language) is 
used to refer to people of servile status. Dominant ideologies portray slaves as incom-
plete beings. The number ‘ten’ (iwey) characterises completeness and is sometimes 
employed to qualify an accomplished man (timme). However, in Niamey young 
people use yegga to refer to the ‘centre-forward’ (the number nine corresponding to 
the position of centre-forward in football). Status ideologies are deeply rooted, and old 
expressions are adapted to changing times and made relevant to the culture of younger 
generations.
 11 For more details on the distinctions between ‘slave’ and ‘captive’ in Songhay -Zarma, 
see Rouch, 1954, and Olivier de Sardan, 1975; 1976; 1984.
 12 These expressions are factually inaccurate insofar as it is possible to find black ‘masters’ 
and red ‘slaves’. Status is tied to a person’s history, not to his/her skin colour. But the 
red/black opposition is used ideologically to simplify and naturalise differences.
 13 The emancipation of slaves in Fulbé and Kel Tamasheq societies during the colonial 
period occurred through progressive departures of slaves from their masters’ camps 
(Bernus, 1981, 111–12; Hardung, 1997). Today physical mobility remains a means for the 
iklan of Bankilaré to evade their masters’ impositions (Boyer, 2005).
 14 Other meanings associated with Gando are discussed in Hardung, 1997, 122.
 15 At baptism or marriage ceremonies, griots reconstruct the genealogies of the families 
involved. As descendants of slaves are ‘without ancestors’, they cannot conduct 
ceremonies in the same manner as free people.
 16 In a number of Gorouol villages nobles and captives are not buried in the same places. 
This is true also for the Kel Tamasheq, whereas among the Gando small burial details 
distinguish a noble’s tomb from that of a commoner (Hardung, 1997, 115).
 17 In each of the societies studied the offspring descending from the union of a noble 
man and a slave woman inherits the status of the father.
 18 This is also true for the Gando of the Borgou who have become wealthier than their 
former masters (Hardung, 1997, 133–34; Lombard, 1965, 405).
 19 In Peul, Kel Tamasheq and Zarma-Songhay societies the slave is supposed to lack 
shame and reserve (haawi in Zarma, senteene in Fulfulde).
 20 See Gluckmann, Mitchell and Barnes, 1949, and Mair, 1968, for early studies of the 
chief ’s intermediary role in Africa. While Van Rouveroy van Niewaal (1999) applies 
this analytical framework to contemporary African chiefs by highlighting the negative 
implications of this position, I am inclined to see it as advantageous and a potential 
source of power for the chief.
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 21 This notion is used by Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan (2000, 18) who 
develop Mendras’ (1976) idea that notables act as ‘screens’ in French rural  societies. The 
image of the gatekeeper is also in Robinson (1975, 291–92), who qualified the interme-
diary position of the traditional administrative chefferie in Africa, and  particularly in 
Niger, as a ‘switch’ joining electric circuits. For an application of the notion of gatekeeper 
to the religious chefferies of the Maraboutic groups of Bankilaré, see Hahonou, 2004a.
 22 Not to be confused with the ‘Touareg rebellion’ of Niger (1991–95), during which status 
distinctions in Kel Tamasheq society were generally erased.
 23 Expression of Olivier de Sardan (1975).
 24 As a consequence of the schooling of slaves and their recruitment in the colonial 
administration, at Niger’s independence Songhay and Zarma masters and slaves 
shared power at the top levels of the state apparatus. But slaves, with few exceptions 
(for example Boubou Hama, president of the National Assembly under the First 
Republic, who was, however, under constant attack for his servile origins), tended to 
occupy secondary roles (cf. Olivier de Sardan 1984, 205).
 25 Contrary to the majority of noble Songhay Peul or Kel Tamasheq families, the Songhay 
of the Gorouol started sending their own children to ‘the White’s school’ (the nearby 
French Catholic Mission) very early. In this case, the descendants of nobles were 
better prepared than other groups to assume positions of power at independence.
 26 The MNSD Nassara is the former state-party (1989–91). Having lost influence after the 
1993 presidential elections (won by Maman Ousmane of the Rahama CDS) and under 
the Baré régime (1996–99), since the 1990s the MNSD has become the dominant 
party in Gorouol and Bankilaré, and in Niger as a whole. The PNDS Tarraya is a 
party that claims to be of socialist inspiration. Led by a native of Tahoua, it gained 
considerable power at the national level with the exception of Western Niger.
 27 Somewhat paradoxically, the communal council of Gorouol is headed by its only Bella 
member (i.e. a Kel Tamasheq of slave descent), who took advantage of the incessant 
struggles between the two rival wings of the Songhay chefferie de canton (cf. Hahonou, 
2007).
 28 Colonial policy was ambiguous and sometimes contradictory on this issue (cf. Bernus, 
1969, 40–42). For example, after 1908–09, several Bella tribes were declared independent 
in the Gourma, whereas in the 1940s in the surroundings of Bankilaré the colonial 
administration decided to support Tuareg religious owners of Bella, in contradiction 
of France’s egalitarian principles, to avoid setting in motion rapid social changes that 
would have been difficult to control.
 29 Tentatively, I am inclined to interpret contemporary axes of electoral support and 
patron–client relations as originating from the ties of fictive kinship between former 
domestic slaves and their masters (Nicolaisen, 1962, 8; Olivier de Sardan, 1984, 12). 
Relations of fictive kinship obtain also between Peuls and Gando in North Benin 
(survey data).
 30 In colonial and post-colonial administrative reports the Kel Igirer are collectively called 
Tinguereguedesh (sometimes Tinguereguedesh-Logomaten or Loghmaten). The ethno-
logical literature generally followed this convention (cf. Bernus, 1963; Urvoy, 1936). 
However, this is a truncated expression provided by the local Kel Tamasheq, defeated 
and suspicious of colonialists. The term Tinguereguedesh (which signifies ‘I am under 
the protection of ’) designates the ‘tent slaves’ who carry out domestic chores in the 
masters’ camps, and who situate themselves generally in the immediate proximity of 
the camp. The same thing happened in the case of the Doufarafarak (literally ‘behind 
the livestock enclosure’), who today prefer being called Kel Ansongo (Hahonou, 2004a, 
15–16). To be cautious, masters gave colonialists the names of their slaves, which then 
remained. The same attitude is at the origin of slave children’s attendance at school in 
the place of the sons of chiefs.
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 31 The status of special circumscription was accorded to the PA of Bankilaré in 1992 
by the ordinances n. 92-058 and 92-059 of 9 December 1992, becoming an electoral 
district and obtaining seats at the National Assembly. These legal measures have 
allowed local minority groups to benefit from a special representation at the National 
Assembly since the 1993 legislature.
 32 Due to the sensitivity of this subject, the proportions between ‘nobles’ and ‘slaves’ are 
highly controversial. Concerning Songhay societies, Olivier de Sardan argues that ‘the 
captives formerly represented more than half the population’ (1983, 132). Referring to 
the Kel Tamasheq, Bernus (1981, 388) notes that in the 1960s more than 80 per cent of 
the Kel Tamasheq of Western Niger were Iklan. Numerous originally servile groups 
of the left riverbank fled their masters and placed themselves under the protection 
of dominant groups of the right riverbank, acquiring liberated status (Bernus, 1981, 
395), which distinguishes them from the Iklan acquired in wars and raids or inherited. 
Bernus (1981, 393) classifies the Imallagazan and Ibahawan as Iklan. In fact, the latter 
two groups were the slaves of the Imghad Iloghmatten at their arrival in the Gourma 
(cf. Hahonou, 2004a).
 33 Taklit: feminine of akli, which signifies slave in the Tamasheq language. On the 
genetrix role of the captive, see Bernus, 1981, 92. Aneslim: Kel Tamasheq religious 
specialist (plur. Ineslimen).
 34 The Timidria association (lit. ‘fraternity’ in Tamasheq) was created in 1991. It militates 
for the recognition of the rights of servile people as full citizens and members of 
Kel Tamasheq societies of Niger. For a general study of the discourse and strategies 
in favour of iklan citizenship, see Tidjani Alou, 2000a and b). For a more detailed 
analysis of Timidria’s activity in Western Niger, see Hahonou, 2003; 2004a; 2005.
 35 For strategic reasons the former MNSD deputy Wassalké Boukari, a Songhay from 
Gorouol and an ex-minister, allied himself with the local opposition to Bankilaré’s 
chieftaincy led by Elhaji Ghoumar (who became national deputy in 1999). The alliance’s 
objective was to win the support of the Kel Tamasheq electorate in the struggle for the 
‘municipalisation’ of the administrative post of Bankilaré (cf. Hahonou, 2004a and b).
 36 Individual status can be ‘read’ on the body from top to bottom. Particular hairstyles, 
clothes and jewels symbolise slavery and bondage, and are opposed to those of free 
and/or elite women. For example, ankle bracelets, often in plastic today, recall the irons 
formerly worn by the Kel Tamasheq slaves. While Timidria militants denounce this 
as an expression of hegemony, women and men of servile status may well interpret 
symbolism differently from masters and possibly valorise it as a source of distinctive 
identity.
 37 Masters maintain privileged relationships with the wet-nurses of their children. This 
relationship (called hasan-nda-hini in Songhay, cf. Olivier de Sardan, 1983) is based 
on the notion that that milk forms a solid bond between children nursed by the same 
woman (the child of the noble and the child of the slave wet-nurse). The ‘pact of milk’ 
is at the basis of joking relationships and political alliances in Kel Tamasheq societies. 
The quote makes implicit reference to this loyalty. The oral history of Bankilaré reports 
that two twins, who were slave wet-nurses, were the founding ancestresses of the Iklan 
tribes closest to the amenokal (chief ) of the Kel Igirer.
 38 Whereas slavery has practically disappeared in the village of Bankilaré, it persists in 
neighbouring camps. Timidria’s action (awareness-raising, surveys, creation of schools) 
is limited to the Kel Tamasheq camps from which the association’s leaders come, and 
to the village of Bankilaré, which has greater media exposure. Thus, in Lemdou and 
Ingui-Ezak (cf. Boyer, 2005), vestiges of slavery are still observable. Slavery is particu-
larly resilient in camps led by the religious chieftaincies (Ineslimen) of the Kel Igirer 
group. This is a consequence of the fear of the religious leaders’ intermediary position 
between God and the profane (cf. Hahonou, 2006). Boyer (2005) observes that in 
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these camps, emancipation is often only temporarily achieved in the course of seasonal 
migration to Côte d’Ivoire.
 39 This is the Tartit association, whose president is also the president of the Bankilaré 
section of the CDS (party represented by candidates of the chefferie amajigh (aristo-
crats) and the chefferie anelism (religious chiefs from Ingui-Ezak) at the municipal 
elections of 2004). As Timidria in the past, this association functions as a ‘develop-
ment broker’, acting as contact point for some aid projects in Bankilaré,
 40 Identity claims ‘transcend the internal hierarchies of Touareg societies, cristallising 
the social convergence generated by state politics. [...] The new ties and networks of 
solidarity engendered the feeling of belonging to the same group, forming a commu-
nity of blood and destiny’ (1995, 436-440) wrote Bourgeot in 1990, in the wave of 
enthusiasm of the nascent Tuareg rebellion. However, identity discourses, trying to 
create cohesion and unify a divided people against an oppressive state, gave way to less 
idealistic realities in which social hierarchies are reaffirmed daily. It is in this context 
that another identity was reinforced, that of the Kel Tamasheq of servile origin, in 
pursuit of political emancipation from their masters.
 41 ‘White Tuareg’, aristocrat, former minister, founder of the PUND Salama, native of 
In Gall (Department of Agadez).
 42 When the first municipal elections were held in February 1999, the PRD Mahiba did 
not gain any of the 11 seats in the municipal council (Sahel Dimanche 19/02/1999). 
The RDP Jama’a party of President Baré gained power after the 1996 coup and gained 
nine seats, whereas the MNSD and the PNDS won one seat each. These results were 
nullified in March and President Baré was deposed by a military coup in April 1999.
 43 The first deputy of Bella origin in the Tillabéri department, which includes Gorouol 
and Bankilaré, was elected in 1995. He was elected as representative of the PUND 
Salama, known locally as ‘Ce gaa party’, literally the ‘party of those who go by foot’, 
with reference to the scarce financial resources of the party (Hahonou, 2005, 40–47).
 44 The Baatombu and Boo were able to manipulate the structures of the modern state, 
revo lutionary and post-revolutionary, better than other groups (cf. De Haan et al., 
1990).
 45 The notion of senteene or semteende (Fulfulde of Northern Nigeria) refers to the typical Peul 
restraint and reserve in manifesting one’s needs, emotions and various physical require-
ments (eating, urinating, etc.); cf. Boesen, 1989; Brandt, 1956, 35; VerEecke, 1994,  30.
 46 The term ‘intellectual’ is used in Benin and Niger with reference to literate and school-
educated people.
 47 Extract from the report of the Conference of the National Sub-Committee of 
Linguistics (Fulfulde)- Laawol Fulfulde, non-paginated. In these ‘revolutionary’ 
times, the term ‘nationality’ was used to designate the ethnic group. Thus, the People’s 
Republic of Benin was conceived as a multi-national state.
 48 In other contexts the term HaaBe or BaleeBe, translated as ‘blacks’, includes slaves (cf. 
Botte, 1994, 116; VerEecke, 1994, 30). Here, due to the inclusive categories adopted 
by Benin’s administration, and to the emphasis on group unity that prevailed at the 
Fulfuldé conference, the term HaaBe does not encompass the Gando.
 49 ‘How can they want to be Peuls? These are je’aaBe (slaves) and that’s evident’ (cited in 
Boesen, 1997, 42). ‘A Gando is a Gando’ (cited in Hardung, 1997, 112).
 50 Bierschenk mentions that the presentation of ‘Peul history and culture’ was an impor-
tant part of the programme, which celebrated Peul values, the idealisation of ‘fulanity’ 
and the construction of ethnic identity (1993, 15, 26).
 51 The report of the Conference of the Laawol Fulfulde linguistic national sub-committee 
(December 1987) states clearly that the history of the Gando remains to be written. 
Bierschenk notes that the shape given by Peul intellectuals to the Kandi conference 
hardly left any space for possible disagreements and criticisms (1993, 33).
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 52 The colonial and post-colonial adminstrations classified the Gando among the ‘Peul’. 
Today the proportions of slave descendants and nobles are still unknown. However, 
in Kalalé, where the ‘Peul’ officially represent 68 per cent of the population (census 
of 1992), the red Peul represent a small minority and the Gando are by far the most 
numerous.
 53 Ourou Sé Guéné presided over the Association for the Economic and Social 
Development of the District of Kalalé (ADESKA) for many years. He was a member 
of the national bureau of the Laawol Fulfulde (responsible for propaganda and infor-
mation), of the Idi Waadi association, and possibly other associations. He was always 
close to organisations of cotton producers, supporting the electoral campaigns of some 
of their leaders.
 54 The president of the RUND party, who is not from Northern Benin, contributed 
financially to the creation of the Idi Waadi association.
 55 After the legislative elections of March 2007, Orou Sé Guéné and his colleague, mayor 
of the neighbouring municipality of Nikki, became the first Gando representatives for 
their regions.
 56 Another Gando had been sub-prefect at an earlier time, towards the end of President 
Kérékou’s revolutionary regime. Coming from another stigmatised ethnic group 
(Somba), Kerekou had intentionally placed a Gando to administer the historic centre 
of the Baatombu kingdom.
 57 It is not uncommon for the members of village organisations to mobilise themselves 
for the liberation of their leaders when these are detained by the police.
 58 ‘Mr. Mayor, we are hungry! If you don’t give each of us 300.000 F CFA as FARD 
Alafia did, we shall be against you in the vote for your impeachment’ declared a 
dozen municipal councillors. The mayor had to give account for the misappropriation 
of 53 million F CFA that represented a subvention to the municipal budget by the 
Communal Union of Cotton Producers.
 59 I recorded this expression at an interview with an officer of the Decentralisation 
Mission (Cotonou, June 2006). This metaphor, which refers to the communal budget, 
fits clearly within the framework of the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart, 1989).
 60 The most common procedure for pocketing money illegally consists in charging 
traders and other market visitors more than the value printed on their receipts 
(inactive values). When tax collectors have to pay the money they have collected into 
the municipal accounts, they only turn in the equivalent of the inactive values that 
were officially sold.
 61 In Kel Tamasheq and Songhay ceremonies, the neck of the sheep is traditionally 
reserved for slaves, whereas the best pieces (fillet, leg) are for the masters. 
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